Zero-knowledge SNARKs (zk-SNARKs) are non-interactive proof systems with short and efficiently verifiable proofs. They elegantly resolve the juxtaposition of individual privacy and public trust, by providing an efficient way of demonstrating knowledge of secret information without actually revealing it. To this day, zk-SNARKs are being used for delegating computation, electronic cryptocurrencies, and anonymous credentials. However, all current SNARKs implementations rely on pre-quantum assumptions and, for this reason, are not expected to withstand cryptanalitic efforts over the next few decades.
INTRODUCTION
Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems. Proof systems [37] are a fundamental tool in theoretical computer science and cryptography. Consider an NP relation ℛ which defines the language of all statements for which there exists a witness so that ℛ , = true. In a zero-knowledge proof for ℛ a prover, knowing a witness, wants to convince a verifier that is in the language, without revealing any additional information about the witness.
Since their introduction in [37] zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs have been shown to be a very powerful instrument in the design of secure cryptographic protocols.
For practical applications, researchers immediately recognized two limiting factors in zero-knowledge proofs: the original protocols were interactive and the proof could be as long as (if not longer than) the witness. When considering statistically sound proof systems for NP, unless some complexity-theoretic collapse occurs, the prover P has to communicate, roughly, as much information as the size of the NP witness. Looking for ways to overcome this bound motivated the study of computationally-sound proof systems, also called argument systems [26] .
Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [21] and succinct ZK arguments [44, 47] were introduced shortly thereafter. Those results were considered mostly theoretical proofs of concept until more recently, when several theoretical and practical breakthroughs [29, 49] have shown that such proofs (renamed zk-SNARGs for Succinct Non-interactive ARGuments, or zk-SNARKs if the proofs also guarantee that the prover knows the witness ) can indeed be used in practical applications.
Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge. Starting from Kilian's protocol [44] , Micali [47] constructed a one-message succinct argument for NP whose soundness is set in the random oracle model. In the plain model, a noninteractive argument requires the verifier V to generate a common reference string crs ahead of time and independently of the statement to be proved by the prover P. Such systems are called succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) [36] . Several SNARGs constructions have been proposed [15-18, 20, 33, 39, 46, 49] , and the area of SNARGs has become popular in the last years with the proposal of constructions which introduced significant improvements in efficiency. An important remark is that all such constructions are based on non-falsifiable assumptions [48] , a class of assumptions that is likely to be inherent in proving the security of SNARGs for general NP languages (without random oracles), as shown by Gentry and Wichs [36] .
Many SNARGs are also arguments of knowledge -so called SNARKs [17, 18] . Intuitively speaking, the knowledge soundness property of SNARKs says that every prover producing a convincing proof must "know" a witness. Proofs of knowledge are useful in many applications, such as anonymous credentials, computation delegation, confidential transactions, and recursive proof composition [19, 51] .
Public vs. Designated Verifiability. We distinguish two types of arguments of knowledge: publicly verifiable ones, where the verification algorithm takes as input only common reference string crs, and designated-verifier ones, where the verifier V takes as input together with the crs some additional private verification key vrs. In the first case, proofs are meant to be verified by anyone having access to the crs. In the case of designated-verifier proofs, the proof can be verified only by the verifier V knowing the secret information vrs. It is straightforward to note that, with the help of an encryption scheme, any publicly-verifiable proof system can be transformed into an analogous designated-verifier one (by just encrypting the proof under the verifier's key).
Quadratic Span Programs. Gennaro, Gentry, Parno and Raykova [33] proposed a new, influential characterization of the complexity class NP using Quadratic Span Programs (QSPs), a natural extension of span programs defined by Karchmer and Wigderson [43] . They show there is a very efficient reduction from boolean circuit satisfiability problems to QSPs. Their work has led to fast progress towards practical verifiable computations. For instance, using Quadratic Arithmetic Programs (QAPs), a generalization of QSPs for arithmetic circuits, Pinocchio [49] provides evidence that verified remote computation can be faster than local computation. At the same time, their construction is zero-knowledge, enabling the server to keep intermediate and additional values used in the computation private. Optimized versions of SNARK protocols based on QSPs approach are used in various practical applications, including cryptocurrencies such as Zcash [13] , to guarantee anonymity while preventing double-spending.
The QSP approach was generalized in [20] under the concept of Linear PCP (LPCP), a form of interactive ZK proofs where security holds under the assumption that the prover is restricted to compute only linear combinations of its inputs. These proofs can then be turned into (designatedverifier) SNARKs by using an extractable linear-only encryption scheme, i.e., an encryption scheme where any adversary can output a valid new ciphertext only if this is an affine combination of some previous encryptions that the adversary had as input (intuitively this "limited malleability" of the encryption scheme, will force the prover into the above restriction).
So far all known zk-SNARKs rely on "classical" prequantum assumptions 1 . Yet, there are widely deployed systems relying on zk-SNARKs (for instance, the Zcash cryptocurrency [14] ) which are expected not to withstand cryptanalitic efforts over the course of the next 10 years [1, Appendix C]. It is an interesting research question, as well our duty as cryptographers, to provide protocols that can guarantee people's privacy over the next decade. We attempt to make a step forward in this direction by building a designated-verifier zk-SNARK from lattice-based (knowledge) assumptions. Our scheme uses as a main building block encodings that rely on the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption, initially proposed by Regev in 2005 [50] , and right now the most widespread post-quantum cryptosystem supported by a theoretical proof of security.
SNARGs based on lattices. Recently, in two companion papers [23, 24] , Boneh et al. provided the first designatedverifier SNARGs construction based on lattice assumptions.
The first paper has two main results: an improvement on the LPCP construction in [20] and a construction of linearonly encryption based on LWE. The second paper presents a different approach where the information-theoretic LPCP is replaced by a LPCP with multiple provers, which is then compiled into a SNARG again via linear-only encryption. The main advantage of this approach is that it reduces the overhead on the prover, achieving what they call quasi-optimality 2 . The stronger notion of knowledge soundness (which leads to SNARKs) can be achieved by replacing the linear-only property with a stronger (extractable) assumption [20] .
Our contributions. In this paper, we frame the construction of Danezis et al. [29] for Square Span Programs in the framework of "encodings" introduced by Gennaro et al. [33] . We slightly modify the definition of encoding to accommodate for the noisy nature of LWE schemes. This allows us to have a more fine-grained control over the error growth, while keeping previous example encodings still valid instantiations. Furthermore, SSPs are similar to but simpler than Quadratic Span Programs (QSPs) since they use a single series of polynomials, rather than 2 or 3. We use SSPs to build simpler and more efficient designated-verifier SNARKs and Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge arguments (NIZKs) for circuit satisfiability (CIRC-SAT).
We think our work is complementary to [23, 24] . However, there are several reasons why we believe that our approach is preferable:
• Zero-Knowledge. The LPCP-based protocols in [23, 24] do not investigate the possibility of achieving zeroknowledge. This leaves open the question of whether [20] . However, in the case of "noisy" encodings, due to possible information leakages in the error term, this transformation cannot be directly applied. Our SNARK construction, being SSP-based, can be made ZK at essentially no cost for either the prover or the verifier. Our transformation is different, exploiting special features of SSPs, and yields a zk-SNARK with almost no overhead. Our construction constitutes the first (designated-verifier) zk-SNARK on lattices.
• Weaker Assumptions. The linear-only property on encodings introduced in [20] implies all the security assumptions needed by a SSP-suitable encoding, but the reverse is not known to hold. Our proof of security therefore relies on weaker assumptions and, by doing so, "distills" the minimal known assumptions needed to prove security for SSP, and instantiates them with lattices. We study the relations between our knowledge assumption and the (extractable) linear-only assumption in Appendix A.
• Simplicity and Efficiency. While the result in [24] seems asymptotically more efficient than any SSP-based approach, we believe that, for many applications, the simplicity and efficiency of the SSP construction will still provide a concrete advantage in practice. We implemented and tested our scheme: we provide some possible concrete parameters for the instantiation of our zk-SNARKs in Table 1 , whereas more details on the implementation, along with benchmark results, are presented in Section 6.
Technical challenges.
Although conceptually similar to the original proof of security for QSP-based SNARKs, our construction must incorporate some additional modifications in order to overcome the noise growth of the LWE-based homomorphic operations. These challenges do not arise in the line of work of Boneh et al. [23, 24] due to the more general (and stronger) assumption of linear-only encoding (see Appendix A for details). Additionally, our construction benefits from the optimizations of SSP-based SNARKs [29] .
Instantiating our encoding scheme with a lattice-based scheme like Regev encryption, differs from [33] and introduces some technicalities, first in the verification step of the protocol, and secondly in the proof of security. Our encoding scheme is additively homomorphic and allows for linear operations; however, correctness of the encoding is guaranteed only for a limited number of homomorphic operations because of the error growth in lattice-based encoding schemes. More specifically, to compute a linear combination of encodings, we need to scale some parameters for correctness to hold. Throughout this work we will consider only encodings where a bounded number of homomorphic "linear" operations is allowed, and make sure that this bound is sufficient to perform verification and to guarantee the existence of a security reduction.
PREREQUISITES 2.1 Notation
Let ∈ N be the computational security parameter, and ∈ N the statistical security parameter. We say that a function is negligible in , and we denote it by negl
for any fixed constant . We also say that a probability is overwhelming in if it is 1 − negl (︀ )︀ . We let M.rl be a length function (i.e., a function N → N polynomially bounded) in defining the length of the randomness for a probabilistic interactive Turing Machine M. When sampling uniformly at random the value from the set , we employ the notation ←$ . When sampling the value from the probabilistic algorithm M, we employ the notation ← M. We use to denote assignment. For an -dimensional column vector , we denote its -th entry by . In the same way, given a polynomial , we denote its -th coefficient by . Unless otherwise stated, the norm ‖·‖ considered in this work is the ℓ 2 norm. We denote by · the dot product between vectors and . Let ℛ bet a relation between statements denoted by and witnesses denoted by . . Unless otherwise specified, all the algorithms defined throughout this work are assumed to be probabilistic Turing machines that run in time poly (︀ )︀ -i.e., PPT. An adversary Session 3C: Crypto: Lattice/ZKP CCS'18, October [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 2018 , Toronto, ON, Canada is denoted by ; when it is interacting with an oracle , we write . For two PPT machines A, B, with the writing A‖B we denote the execution of A followed by the execution of B on the same input and with the same random coins. The output of the two machines is concatenated and separated with a semicolon, e.g.,
Square Span Programs
We characterize NP as Square Span Programs (SSPs) over some field F of order . SSPs were introduced first by Danezis et al. [29] . 
Definition 2.1 (SSP
We say that ssp verifies a boolean circuit C :
Universal circuit. In the definition, we may see C as a logical specification of a satisfiability problem. In our zk-SNARK we will split the ℓ inputs into ℓ public and ℓ private inputs to make it compatible with the universal circuit : {0, 1} ℓ ×{0, 1} ℓ → {0, 1}, that take as input an ℓ -bit description of a freely chosen circuit C and an ℓ -bit value , and return 1 if and only if C = 1. Along the lines of [29] , we consider the "public" inputs from the point of view of the prover. For an outsourced computation, they might include both the inputs sent by the clients and the outputs returned by the server performing the computation. 
Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments
In this section we provide formal definitions for the notion of succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs).
Definition 2.3.
A non-interactive (NI) proof system for a relation ℛ is a triple of algorithms Π = G, P, V as follows: crs, vrs, td ← G1 , ℛ the CRS generation algorithm takes as input some security parameter in unary 1 and outputs a common reference string crs that will be given publicly, a verification key vrs, and trapdoor information td. ← Pcrs, , the prover algorithm takes as input the CRS, a statement , and a witness . It outputs some proof . bool ← Vvrs, , the verifier algorithm takes as input a statement together with a proof , and vrs. It outputs true if the proof was accepted, false otherwise.
In the same line of past works [29, 31] , we will assume for simplicity that crs can be extracted from the verification key vrs, and that the unary security parameter 1 as well as the relation ℛ can be inferred from the crs.
Non-interactive proof systems are generally asked to satisfy some security properties that simultaneously protect the prover from the disclosure of the witness, and the verifier from a forged proof. We now examine some of these notions.
A proof is complete if every correctly-generated proof verifies. More formally,
Definition 2.4 (Completeness).
A non-interactive proof system Π for the relation ℛ is (computationally) complete if for any PPT adversary :
where COMPL Π,ℛ, is the game depicted in Fig. 1 .
The concept that the prover "must know" a witness is expressed by assuming that such knowledge can be efficiently extracted from the prover by means of a so-called knowledge extractor. For any prover able to produce a valid proof, there exists an efficient algorithm which, when given the same inputs as the prover (and the same random coins), is capable of extracting a witness for the given statement. Formally:
Definition 2.5 (Knowledge Soundness).
A non-interactive proof system Π for the relation ℛ is knowledge-sound if for any PPT adversary there exists an extractor Ext such that:
where KSND Π,ℛ, ,Ext is defined in Figure 1 .
An argument of knowledge is a knowledge-sound proof system. If the adversary is computationally unbounded, we speak of proofs rather than arguments. A proof system Π for ℛ is zero-knowledge if no information about the witness is leaked by the proof. More precisely, Π specifies an additional poly (︀ )︀ algorithm Π.Sim that takes as input the trapdoor information td and a statement , and outputs a valid proof indistinguishable from those generated via Π.P.
Definition 2.6 (Zero-Knowledge).
A non-interactive proof system Π is zero-knowledge if there for any PPT adversary :
where ZK Π,ℛ, is defined in Figure 1 .
Succinctness. Finally, we say that a proof system Π is succinct if the proof has size (quasi-)linear in the security parameter, i.e., | | =˜.
Definition 2.7 (SNARK).
A succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK) is a non-interactive proof system that is complete, succinct, and knowledge-sound. A zk-SNARK is a SNARK with zero-knowledge.
Publicly verifiable vs. designated verifier.
If security (knowledge soundness) holds against adversaries that have also access to the verification state vrs (i.e., receives vrs ) then the SNARK is called publicly verifiable, otherwise it is designatedverifier.
In the remainder of this work all constructions and proofs are given for the designated-verifier setting.
Encoding Schemes
Encoding schemes for SNARKs were initially introduced in [33] . Here, we present a variant of this definition that accommodates for encodings with noise.
Definition 2.8 (Encoding Scheme). An encoding scheme
Enc over a field F is composed of the following algorithms:
• pk, sk ← K1 , a key generation algorithm that takes as input some security parameter in unary 1 and outputs some secret state sk together with some public information pk. To ease notation, we are going to assume the message space is always part of the public information and that pk can be derived from sk.
• ← E , a non-deterministic encoding algorithm mapping a field element to some encoding space , such that {{E } : ∈ F} partitions , where {E } denotes the set of the possible evaluations of the algorithm E on .
Depending on the encoding algorithm, E will require either the public information pk generated from K or the secret state sk. For our application, it will be the case of sk. To ease notation, we will omit this additional argument.
The above algorithms must satisfy the following properties:
-linearly homomorphic: there exists a poly (︀ )︀ algorithm Eval that, given as input the public parameters pk, a vector of encodings
, and coeffi-
∈ F , outputs a valid encoding of · with probability overwhelming in . quadratic root detection: there exists an efficient algorithm that, given some parameter (either pk or sk), E 0 , . . . , E , and the quadratic polynomial pp ∈ F 0 , . . . , , can distinguish if pp 1 , . . . , = 0. With a slight abuse of notation, we will adopt the writing ppct 0 , . . . , ct = 0 to denote the quadratic root detection algorithm with inputs , ct 0 , . . . , ct , and pp. image verification: there exists an efficiently computable algorithm ∈ that, given as input some parameter (again, either pk or sk), can distinguish if an element is a correct encoding of a field element.
Our specific instantiation of the encoding scheme presents some slight differences with [33] . In fact, we can allow only for a limited number of homomorphic operations because of the error growth in lattice-based encoding schemes. We note that this modification does not invalidate previous constructions. Sometimes, in order to ease notation, we will employ the writing ct Eval
. It will be clear from the context (and the use of symbol for assignment instead of that for sampling) that the randomized encoding algorithm E is not actually invoked.
Decoding algorithm. When using a homomorphic encryption scheme in order to instantiate an encoding scheme, we simply define the decoding algorithm D as the decryption procedure of the scheme. More specifically, since we study encoding schemes derived from encryption functions, quadratic root detection and image verification for designated-verifiers are trivially obtained by using the decryption procedure D. 
Assumptions
Throughout this work we rely on a number of computational assumptions. All of them are long-standing assumptions in the frame of dLog-hard groups, and have already been generalized in the scope of "encoding schemes" in [33] . We recall them here for completeness. The -power knowledge of exponent assumption ( -PKE) is a generalization of the knowledge of exponent assumption (KEA) introduced by Damgard [28] . It says that given E , . . . , E and E , . . . , E for some coefficient , it is difficult to generate ct,̂︀ ct that encode , without knowing the linear combination of the powers of that produces ct.
Assumption 1 ( -PKE). The -Power Knowledge of Exponent ( -PKE) assumption holds relative to an encoding scheme Enc and for the class of auxiliary input generators if, for every non-uniform PPT auxiliary input generator
∈ and non-uniform PPT adversary , there exists a non-uniform extractor Ext such that:
where q-PKE Enc, , ,Ext is the game depicted in Figure 2 .
The -PDH assumption has been a long-standing, standard -type assumption [22, 39] , It basically states that given
, it is hard to compute an encoding of the missing power E +1 .
Assumption 2 ( -PDH). The -Power Diffie-Hellman ( -PDH) assumption holds for encoding Enc if for all PPT adversaries
we have:
where q-PDH Enc, is defined as in Figure 2 .
Optionally, to achieve strong-soundness (see Remark 1), we need an assumption to be able to "compare" adversariallygenerated messages. The -PKEQ assumptions states that for any adversary that outputs two ciphertexts, there exists an extractor Ext that can tell whether they encode the same value.
Assumption 3 ( -PKEQ). The -Power Knowledge of Equality ( -PKEQ) assumption holds for the encoding scheme Enc if, for every PPT adversary , there exists an extractor Ext such that:
where q-PKEQ Enc, ,Ext is the game depicted in Figure 2 .
Te -PKEQ assumption is needed solely in the case where the attacker has access to a verification oracle. Since the encoding could be non-deterministic, the simulator in the security reduction of Section 5.2 needs to rely on -PKEQ to simulate the verification oracle. Pragmatically, this assumption allows us to test for equality of two adversariallyproduced encodings without having access to the secret key.
Finally, we recall here a well-known assumption for lattices, that we will use to instantiate our quantum-secure encoding scheme.
Assumption 4 (dLWE). The decisional Learning With Errors (dLWE) assumption holds for a parameter generation algorithm Pg if for any PPT adversary :
where dLWE Pg, is defined as in Figure 3 .
In [50] , Regev showed that solving the decisional LWE problem is as hard as solving some lattice problems in the worst case.
AN ENCODING SCHEME BASED ON LEARNING WITH ERRORS
In this section we describe a possible instantiation of the encoding scheme based on learning with errors (LWE).
Lattice-based Encoding Scheme
We propose an encoding scheme Enc that consists of three algorithms as depicted in Figure 4 . This is a slight variation of the classical LWE cryptosystem initially presented by Regev [50] and later extended in [25] . The encoding scheme Enc is described by parameters Γ , , , , with , , ∈ N such that , = 1, and 0 < < 1. Our construction is an extension of the one presented in [25] .
We assume the existence of a deterministic algorithm Pg that, given as input the security parameter in unary 1 , outputs an LWE encoding description Γ. The choice of using a deterministic parameter generation Pg was already argued by Bellare et al. [11] . The main advantage of this choice is that every entity can (re)compute the description for a given security parameter, and that no single party needs to be trusted with generating the encoding parameters. Moreover, it is often the case that real-world encodings have fixed parameters for some well-known values of . For the sake of simplicity, we define our encoding scheme with a LWE encoding description Γ and assume that the security parameter can be derived from Γ. Roughly speaking, the public information is constituted by the LWE parameters Γ and an encoding of is simply an LWE encryption of . The LWE secret key constitutes the secret state of the encoding scheme.
Basic Properties
Correctness. We say that the encoding scheme is (statistically) correct if all valid encodings are decoded successfully (with overwhelming probability). 
We say that an encoding is fresh if it is generated through the E algorithm. We say that an encoding is stale if it is not fresh. Figure 2 : Games for -PKE, -PKEQ, -PDH assumptions.
Game dLWE Pg, Image verification. Using the decryption algorithm D, and provided with the secret key (i.e., sk), we can implement image verification. The algorithm ∈ for image verification proceeds as follows: decrypts the encoded element and tests for equality between the two messages.
Quadratic root detection. The algorithm for quadratic root detection is straightforward using D: decrypt the message and evaluate the polynomial, testing if it is equal to 0.
-linearly homomorphicity. Given a vector of encod-
and a vector of coefficients ∈ Z , the homomorphic evaluation algorithm is defined as follows:
Technical Challenges
Noise growth. During the homomorphic evaluation the noise grows as a result of the operations which are performed on the encodings. Consequently, in order to ensure that the output of Eval is a valid encoding of the expected result, we need to start with a sufficiently small noise in each of the initial encodings.
In order to bound the size of the noise, we first need a basic theorem on the tail bound of discrete Gaussian distributions due to Banaszczyk [9] : 
At this point, this corollary follows: Proof. The fact that the message part is · is trivially true by simple homomorphic linear operations on the encodings. Then the final encoding is valid if the error does not grow too much during these operations. Let ∈ Z be the vector of all the error terms in the encodings, and let = √ . Then by Lemma 3.3 we have:
For correctness we need the absolute value of the final noise to be less than 2 (cf. Lemma 3.2). Since it holds that ∀ ∈ Z , ‖ ‖ ≤ √ , we can state that correctness holds if:
Smudging. When computing a linear combination of encodings, the distribution of the error term in the final encoding does not result in a correctly distributed fresh encoding. The resulting error distribution depends on the coefficients used for the linear combination, and despite correctness of the decryption still holds, the error could reveal more than just the plaintext. We combine homomorphic evaluation with a technique called smudging [7] , which "smudges out" any difference in the distribution that is due to the coefficients of the linear combination, thus hiding any potential information leak. This technique has been also called "noise flooding" in the past [10] . In order to preserve the correctness of the encoding scheme while allowing linear evaluations, we need once again to be large enough to accommodate for the flooding noise. In particular, will have to be at least superpolynomial in the statistical security parameter . Figure 4 : An encoding scheme based on LWE.
Procedure test-error , 0 , 1 Proof. The claim on the statistical distance follows immediately from Lemma 3.5 and the fact that the message part is · is true by simple homomorphic linear operations on the encodings. In order to ensure that the final result is a valid encoding, we need to make sure that the error in this output encoding remains smaller than 2 . The final error is upper bounded by Eval + , so we have
Error testing. By making non-blackbox use of our LWE encoding scheme, it is possible to define an implementation of the function test-error in order to guarantee the existence of a security reduction from adversarially-generated proofs. In fact, it is not sufficient to show that a series of homomorphic operations over a forged proof can break one of the assumptions. We must also guarantee that these manipulations do not alter the correctness of the encoded value. In the specific case of LWE encodings, it is sufficient to use the secret key, recover the error, and enforce an upper bound on its norm. A possible implementation of test-error is displayed in Figure 5 .
Other requirements for security reduction. The following lemma will be needed later during the security proof. It essentially defines the conditions under which we can take an encoding, add a smudging term to its noise, sum it with the output of an execution of Eval and finally multiply the result by an element in Z . 
Proof. The correctness of the message part comes immediately from performing homomorphic linear operations on encodings, and the final output is valid if the noise remains below a certain threshold. After adding the smudging term and performing the sum, the noise term is at most
After the multiplication by a coefficient bounded by , it is at most
. Thus, the encoding is valid if:
which immediately gives the result. □
Conditions on the modulus . Corollaries 3.4 and 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 give the conditions that the modulus has to respect in order to allow for all the necessary computations. In particular, Corollary 3.4 gives the condition to be able to homomorphically evaluate a linear combination of fresh encodings through the algorithm Eval; Corollary 3.6 gives the condition to be able to add a smudging noise to the result of such an evaluation; Lemma 3.7 gives a condition that will have to be satisfied in the security reduction. They are ordered from the least stringent to the most stringent, so the condition that must be satisfied in the end is the one given by Lemma 3.7:
Leftover hash lemma (LHL). We now recall the definition of min-entropy, and the famous "leftover hash lemma" introduced by Impagliazzo et al. [42] . 
Then, for any random variable ,
where ℓ ←$ {0, 1} ℓ .
Zero-Knowledge. We now present a version of the LHL that will be useful later in this work, when proving the zeroknowledge property of our construction. In a nutshell, it says that a random linear combination of the columns of a matrix is statistically close to a uniformly random vector, for some particular choice of coefficients. 
where A is computed modulo , and ←$ Z .
Proof. For the vector , we have that ∞ (︀ )︀
= log . Then the proof is immediate from Lemma 3.9:
□

OUR DESIGNATED-VERIFIER ZK-SNARK
Let Enc be an encoding scheme (Definition 2.8). Let C be some circuit taking as input an ℓ -bit string and outputting 0 or 1. Let ℓ ℓ + ℓ , where ℓ is the length of the "public" input, and ℓ the length of the private input. The value corresponds to the number of wires in C and to the number of fan-in 2 gates. Let + . We construct a zk-SNARK scheme for any relation ℛ C on pairs , ∈ {0, 1} ℓ ×{0, 1} ℓ that can be computed by a polynomial size circuit C with wires and gates. Our protocol is formally depicted in Figure 6 .
CRS generation. The setup algorithm G takes as input some complexity 1 in unary form and the circuit C : {0, 1} ℓ × {0, 1} ℓ → {0, 1}. It generates a square span program of degree = + over a field F, of size |F| ≥ that verifies C by running:
Then, it runs pk, sk ← K1 using the encoding scheme Enc. Finally, it samples , , ← F such that 0, and returns the CRS:
The error for each of these encodings has to be chosen carefully. In a nutshell, we need to intentionally increase the magnitude of the noise in some encodings, in order to mimic its distribution in the simulated CRS provided to the adversary in the security reduction. Failing to do so results in limiting the adversary's ability to perform homomorphic operations on the CRS and, thus, in a flawed proof. We defer further analysis on this point to Section 6. The verification string vrs, as well as the trapdoor td, consists of the secret key sk of the encoding scheme, and the secrets , , (we implicitly include the crs in vrs).
Prover. The prover algorithm, on input some statement 
whose coefficients can be computed from the polynomials provided in the ssp; them by linear evaluation it is possible to obtain:
In fact, the encoding -respectively,̂︀ -can be computed from the encodings of 1, , . . . , -respectively, , , . . . , -and the coefficients of Equation (5) . The element̂︀ can be computed from the encodings of , . . . ,
. Finally, -respectively, -can be computed from the encodings of , . . . , -respectively, , ℓ +1 , . . . , . All these linear evaluations involve at most + 1 terms and the coefficients are bounded by . Using the above elements, the prover returns a proof ,̂︀,̂︀ , , .
Verifier. Upon receiving a proof and a statement = 1 , . . . , ℓ , the verifier, in possession of the verification key vrs (that implicitly contains the crs), proceeds with the following verifications. First, it uses the quadratic root detection algorithm of the encoding scheme Enc to verify that the proof satisfies:̂︀ ℎ − ℎ = 0 and̂︀ − = 0, (eq-pke) EvalE ,
Apply smudging on ,̂︀,̂︀, , procedure, implemented in Figure 5 for the specific case of lattice encodings. More precisely, the verifier tests whether it is still possible to add another encoding and multiply the result by an element bounded by , without compromising the correctness of the encoded element. This will guarantee the existence of a reduction in the knowledge soundness proof of Section 5.2. If all above checks hold, the verifier returns true. Otherwise, return false. Section 5 , and then analyzed more pragmatically in Section 6.
Remark 2. Instantiating our encoding scheme on top of a "noisy" encryption scheme like Regev's introduces multiple technicalities that affect the protocol, the security proof, and the parameters' choice. For instance, in order to compute a linear combination of encodings via Eval we need to scale down the error parameter and consequently increase the parameters and in order to maintain correctness and security. Similarly, the distributions of the error terms and the random vectors are affected by the homomorphic evaluation, and we must guarantee that the resulting terms are still simulatable. All these issues will be formally addressed in
PROOFS OF SECURITY
In this section, we prove our main theorem:
. If the -PKE, -PKEQ and -PDH assumptions hold for the encoding scheme Enc, the protocol Π on Enc is a zk-SNARK with statistical completeness, statistical zero-knowledge and computational knowledge soundness.
Proof of statistical completeness. Corollary 3.4 states the conditions on Γ for which the homomorphically computed encodings are valid with probability at least 1 − negl (︀ )︀ . Lemma 3.7 affirms that correctly generated proofs satisfy Equation (2) with probability overwhelming in . Therefore test-error returns true and completeness follows trivially by Theorem 2.2. □
Zero-Knowledge
In order to obtain a zero-knowledge protocol, we perform smudging of the proofs terms, and we randomize the target polynomial . The first step hides the witness, the second makes the distribution of the final noise independent from the coefficient . The random vectors constituting the first element of the ciphertext are guaranteed to be statistically indistinguishable from uniformly random vectors by leftover hash lemma (cf. Lemma 3.10).
Proof of zero-knowledge. The simulator for zeroknowledge is shown in Figure 7 . The error are independently sampled from the same uniform distribution over the (integer) interval −2 , 2 , where is a small constant and
We will call this the smudging distribution.
Checking that the proof output by Π.Sim is indeed correct (i.e., that it verifies Eqs. (eq-pke) to (eq-lin)) is trivial. We are left with showing that the two proofs are statistically indistinguishable.
Note that once the value of in the proof has been fixed, the verification equations uniquely determine ,̂︀,̂︀ , and . This means that for any , such that C , = 1, both the real arguments and the simulated arguments are chosen uniformly at random such that the verification equations will be satisfied. One can prove that values for are statistically indistinguishable when executing Π.P and Π.Sim:
is the encoding of a uniformly random variable in Π.Sim and the masking of a polynomial evaluation by adding , where is chosen uniformly at random (note that 0) in Π.P. Figure 7 : Simulator for Zero-Knowledge.
What is encoded in the remaining terms is simply dictated by the verification constraints. In both worlds, the proof is a tuple of 5 encodings ,̂︀,̂︀ , , . Once the vrs is fixed, each encoding can be written as − , · + + , for some ∈ Z and some ∈ Z satisfying the verification equations. Due to Lemma 3.9, the random vectors are indistinguishable from uniformly random in both worlds. The error terms are statistically indistinguishable due to Lemma 3.5. (See Section 6 for a detailed explanation of these values.) □ Zero-knowledge comes at a cost: smudging the error terms requires us to scale the ciphertext modulus by bits. For those applications where zero-knowledge is not required, we can simplify the protocol by removing from the computation of ℎ and avoiding the smudging procedure on every proof term. In Table 1 we show some choices of parameters, both with and without zero-knowledge.
Knowledge Soundness
Before diving into the technical details of the proof of soundness, we provide some intuition in an informal sketch of the security reductions: the CRS for the scheme contains encodings of E , . . . , E , as well as encodings of these terms multiplied by some field elements , ∈ F. The scheme requires the prover P to exhibit encodings computed homomorphically from such CRS.
The reason for requiring the prover to duplicate its effort w.r.t. is so that the simulator in the security proof can extract representations of̂︀ ,̂︀ as degree-polynomials , ℎ such that = , ℎ = ℎ , by the -PKE assumption (for = ). The assumption also guarantees that this extraction is efficient. This explains the first quadratic root detection check Equation (eq-pke) in the verification algorithm.
Suppose an adversary manages to forge a SNARK of a false statement and pass the verification test. Then, by soundness of the square span program (Theorem 2.2), for the extracted polynomials , ℎ and for the new defined polynomial mid − 0 − ℓ , one of the following must be true:
ii. mid Span ℓ +1 , . . . , , but is a valid encoding of E mid , from Equation (eq-lin).
If the first case holds, then 2 −1−ℎ is a nonzero polynomial of degree some ≤ 2 that has as a root, since the verification test implies 2 − 1 − ℎ = 0. The simulator can use to solve -PDH for ≥ 2 − 1 using the fact that E (︀ +1− )︀ ∈ {E0} and subtracting off encodings of lower powers of to get E +1 .
To handle the second case, i.e., to ensure that mid is in the linear span of the 's with ℓ < ≤ we use an extra scalar , supplement the CRS with the terms {E } >ℓ , E , and require the prover to present (encoded) mid in its proof. The adversary against -PDH will choose a polynomial convenient to solve the given instance. More specifically, it sets with respect to the set of polynomials { } >ℓ such that the coefficient for +1 in mid is zero. Then, to generate the values in the crs it sets (which can be computed from its input consisting of encodings of powers of ). Using the above, it runs the SNARK adversary and to obtain from its output an encoding of some polynomial with coefficient
+1
non-zero and thus solve -PDH. Also here, the verification algorithm guarantees that even with all the above homomorphic operations, the challenger still decrypts the correct value with 1 − negl (︀ )︀ probability. The complete and formal proof is given in Appendix B. As previously mentioned in Remark 1, the proof of knowledge soundness allows oracle access to the verification procedure. In the context of a weaker notion of soundness where the adversary does not have access to the Π.Vvrs, ·, · oracle, the proof is almost identical, except that there is no need for the ℬ PDH adversary to answer queries and to simulate the verification, and therefore no need for the -PKEQ assumption. This greatly simplifies our construction: the protocol does not need to rely on the -PKEQ assumption, and the prime modulus can be of bits.
EFFICIENCY AND CONCRETE PARAMETERS
The prover's computations are bounded by the security parameter and the size of the circuit, i.e., P ∈̃︀ (︀ )︀
. As in [29, 33] , the verifier's computations depend solely on the security parameter, i.e., V ∈ (︀ )︀ Using the propositions from Section 3 and knowing the exact number of homomorphic operations that need to be performed in order to produce a proof, we can now attempt at providing some concrete parameters for our encoding scheme.
We fix the statistical security parameter 32, as already done in past works on fully homomorphic encryption (e.g., [27, 30] ). We fix the circuit size 2 15 , which is sufficient for some practical applications such as the computation of Session 3C: Crypto: Lattice/ZKP CCS'18, October [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 2018 , Toronto, ON, Canada SHA-256. For some practical examples of circuits, we direct the reader towards [13, 49] . For a first attempt at implementing our solution, we assume a weaker notion of soundness, i.e., that in the KSND game the adversary does not have access to a verification oracle (cf. Figure 1) . Concretely, this means that the only bound in the size of is given by the guessing probability of the witness, and the guessing of a field element. We thus fix to be a prime 3 of 32 bits for the size of the message space. The CRS is composed of encodings of different nature: some of them are fresh E1, E , . . . , E , some happen to be stale in the construction of PKE and the construction of
, and some are stale from the construction of ℬ PDH Section 5.2 (Item ii.)
). Since, as we have seen, ℬ PDH manipulates the -PDH challenge via homomorphic operations, we must guarantee that the protocol adversary can perform at least the same number of homomorphic operations as in the real-world protocol. Therefore, in the real protocol, we must intentionally increase the magnitude of the noise in the CRS: the terms E (with = 0, . . . , ) are generated by multiplying the respective fresh encoding E by a term bounded by ; the terms E ,{E } instead are generated via Eval of + 1 elements with coefficients bounded by . Concretely, when encoding these elements using the encoding scheme of Section 3, the error for E is sampled from · ; the error for E , E is sampled from √ + 1 · . The proof consists of five elements ,̂︀,̂︀ , , , as per Equation (6) . and are computed using an affine function on encodings with coefficients modulo ;̂︀,̂︀ are computed using a linear function on + 1 encodings with coefficients modulo ; finally, is computed using a linear combination of − ℓ encodings with coefficients in {0, 1}, except the last one which is modulo . Overall, the term that carries the highest load of homomorphic computations is . To it, we add a smudging term for constructing a zero-knowledge proof .
In the construction of the adversary ℬ PDH (Item ii.) we need to perform some further homomorphic operations on the proof element in order to solve the -PDH challenge, namely one addition (Equation (8)) and one multiplication by a known scalar bounded by .
We now outline the calculations that we use to choose the relevant parameters for our encoding scheme. In particular, we will focus on the term since, as already stated, it is the one that is involved in the largest number of homomorphic operations. The correctness of the other terms follows directly from Corollary 3.4.
First of all, the terms (︀ )︀ and are produced through the algorithm Eval executed on + 1 fresh encodings with coefficients modulo . Let be the discrete Gaussian parameter of the noise terms in fresh encodings; then, by Pythagorean additivity, the Gaussian parameter of encodings output by this homomorphic evaluation is Eval √ + 1. Then the term is multiplied by a coefficient in Z , and the result is added to a subset sum of the terms (︀ )︀ , i.e., a weighted sum with coefficients in {0, 1}. It is trivial to see that, for the first term, the resulting Gaussian parameter is bounded by Eval , whereas for the second term it is bounded by Eval √ − ℓ . The parameter of the sum of these two terms is then bounded by Eval √︀ 2 + − ℓ . Let us then consider a constant factor for "cutting the Gaussian tails", i.e., such that the probability of sampling from the distribution and obtaining a value with magnitude larger than times the standard deviation is as small as desired. We can then write that the absolute value of the error in is bounded by . At this point we add a smudging term, which amounts to multiplying the norm of the noise by Corollary 3.6) . Finally, the so-obtained encoding has to be summed with the output of an Eval invoked on 2 fresh encodings with coefficients modulo and multiplied by a constant in Z . The final noise is then bounded by
. By substituting the values of Eval , , remembering that and imposing the condition for having a valid encoding, we obtain
The above corresponds to Equation (3) with bounds and Eval Eval . By simplifying and isolating , we get:
With our choice of parameters and by taking = 8, we can select for instance = 2 −180 . Once and are chosen, we select the remaining parameters and in order to achieve the desired level of security for the LWE encoding scheme. To do so, we take advantage of Albrecht's estimator 4 [5] which, as of now, covers the following attacks: meet-in-the-middle exhaustive search, coded-BKW [40] , dual-lattice attack and small/sparse secret variant [2] , lattice reduction with enumeration [45] , primal attack via uSVP [4, 8] , Arora-Ge algorithm [6] using Gröbner bases [3] . Some possible choices of parameters are reported in Table 1 .
Finally, based on these parameters, we can concretely compute the size of the CRS 5 and that of the proof . The CRS is composed of + (︀ )︀ log bits 6 . For the calculations, we bound by and state that the 4 https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator 5 We take into account only the encodings that are contained in the CRS. The other terms have considerably smaller impact on its size or can be agreed upon offline (e.g., the SSP). 6 Note that the magnitude of the noise term, i.e., whether the encoding is fresh or stale, has no impact on the size of an encoding. This size is 
where the vector is the output of a seeded PRG. This has been proven secure in the random oracle model [32] . Therefore, the communication complexity is greatly reduced, as sending an LWE encoding just amounts to sending the seed for the PRG and the value ∈ Z . For security to hold, we can take the size of the seed to be bits, thus obtaining the final size of the CRS: )︀ log bits. Note that in this case we cannot trivially use the same trick with the PRG, since the encodings are produced through homomorphic evaluations.
In Table 2 we show a comparison between our implementation, the zk-SNARK of [49] (informally called "Pinocchio"), and the recent implementation of [23] by Samir Menon, Brennan Shacklett, and David Wu 7 . Despite the fact that the construction of Parno et al. [49] is fundamentally different as it targets encoding over elliptic curves, we believe that they provide a good term of comparison (when used with circuits of the same size) for the loss incurred when using lattice-based encodings instead. Note therefore that the security parameter of [49] is not comparable with the two other results.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the implementation of [23] targets 80 bits of security, which is justified using the estimate provided in [45] . We report = 100 as given by Albrecht's tool [5] , which we believe to be more accurate. Nonetheless, the estimated post-quantum security level is 50, thus insufficient for modern applications. Additionally, we note that, despite targeting the construction of SNARGs, it seems the construction of [23] can be turned into a SNARK by using the stronger extractable linear-only assumption. In order to achieve this, they can use a technique called double encryption, which doubles the size of each ciphertext. More details about this are given in Appendix A.
Implementation
We implemented our construction in standard C11, using the library GMP [38] for handling arbitrary precision integers and the library FLINT [41] for handling polynomials. We chose the pseudo-Mersenne prime 2 32 − 5, and a the modulus 2 736 . This allows for fast arithmetic operations:
a function only of (the number of elements in the vector) and the modulus . 7 Results are extracted from the source code at https://github.com/ dwu4/lattice-snarg. reduction modulo simply consists in a bitmask, modular operations by can fit a uint64_t type, and multiplication of a scalar modulo to a vector in Z +1 does not require any memory allocation for the carry. The dimension of the lattice was chosen = 1470, corresponding to the "medium" security level displayed in Table 1 .
We performed extensive benchmarks of our protocol on a single thread of an Intel Core i7-4720HQ CPU @ 2.60GHz, running Arch Linux (kernel version 4.14.39). Our implementation is publicly available 8 . Measurements were done over 100, 000 samples. Time is measured using gettimeofday(2). Encoding a uniformly random element of Z using Enc.E takes on average 310 µs (std. dev. 34 µs); decoding it using Enc.D is about the same order of magnitude, 197 µs (std. dev. 24 µs).
The algorithm for homomorphic evaluations Eval is able to compute a linear combination of 2 15 ciphertexts with coefficients modulo in roughly 13 s (c.f. Figure 8) . This gives us a good estimate for the effective cost of proving satisfiability of a boolean circuit with roughly 2 14 multiplication gates: we measured 100.17 s for the CRS generation algorithm; 64.58 s for the prover; 3.49 ms for the verifier. More details can be found in the full version [34] .
Appendices A LATTICES AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this appendix, we first give a quick refresher about lattices and Gaussian distributions. Then, we move to analyzing the assumptions that we make in this work and how they relate to the assumptions made in previous works.
Lattices. A -dimensional lattice Λ is a discrete additive subgroup of R . For an integer < and a rank matrix
is the lattice generated by the columns of .
Gaussian distribution. For any
∈ R + , let
be the Gaussian function over R with mean 0 and parameter . For any discrete subset ⊆ R we define ∈ , the discrete integral of over . We then define , the discrete Gaussian distribution over with mean 0 and parameter as:
We denote by the discrete Gaussian distribution over R where each entry is independently sampled from . At a first glimpse, it might seem unjustified to have brought assumptions often used in the dLog setting into the lattice domain, where they are highly non-standard. Despite this fact, in this section we argue (i) that the -PKE and -PDH assumptions are weaker than the targeted linear-only malleability of [20, 23] , and (ii) which consequences an attack on those assumptions would have.
Over the course of the last years, a long line of research in lattice-based cryptography has been trying to develop fullyhomomorphic encryption schemes and bilinear pairing maps. So far, no bilinear map is known in the context of lattices, and some have argued that its existence would lead to efficient cryptographic primitives such as multilinear maps and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). Furthermore, although there exist FHE schemes based on lattices, it is not clear how to achieve it without giving away additional information such as encryption of the secret key itself. Showing that it is possible to indeed compute non-linear homomorphisms on top of Regev's encryption scheme would be a major breakthrough in both research areas. We see this as a win-win situation.
Moreover, our assumptions are weaker than previously employed assumptions for lattice-based SNARGs. Indeed, the linear-only assumption of [20, 23] informally states that an adversary can only perform affine operations over the encodings provided as input. More specifically:
Definition A.1 (EXT-LO, [20] ). An encoding scheme Enc satisfies extractable linear-only target malleability if for all PPT adversaries and plaintext generation algorithm M there exists an efficient extractor Ext such that the advantage
, where EXT-LO Enc,M, ,Ext is defined as in Figure 9 . Figure 9 : Game for Extractable Linear-Only target malleability.
We note that, despite [20] presents the above assumption for so-called linear-only encryption schemes, all such schemes are also encodings satisfying the properties of Definition 2.8.
It is not immediately clear to see what does this assumption imply in the case of LWE encodings (like the one we presented in section Section 3) or the one in [45] , used in [23] . Consider for example a set of parameters Γ allowing for − 1 homomorphic operations modulo and the adversary that, upon receiving as input ciphertexts, computes homomorphic linear operations on them. With non-negligible probability the error wraps around the modular representation, leading to a "decryptable" encoding (any element of Z +1 is a valid encoding) but for which the adversary does not know an affine map. The authors of [23] suggest to use double-encryption in these cases, i.e., present two different encodings of each value, and ask the adversary to homomorphically evaluate these terms twice. If the two ciphertexts do not encode the same element, the game is lost. Obviously, this comes at the cost of doubling the size of each encoding and doubling the computation time for the prover and the verifier. Proof. We will show that Enc satisfies -PKE, meaning there is no PKE ‖Ext able to win the -PKE game (cf. Figure 2) .
Suppose by contradiction that there exists an adversary PKE able to produce a valid output ct,̂︀ ct, i.e., such that ct −̂︀ ct = 0. We show that as a consequence there exists an extractor Ext that outputs the correct linear combination with non negligible probability.
Let M be the plaintext generation algorithm that, upon receiving the computational security parameter and = 2 + 2 in unary form, samples ←$ F and outputs plaintexts 1, , . . . , . Let ← E1, E , . . . , E , E , E , . . . , E . The adversary PKE , when run on this input , outputs (with non-negligible probability) ct,̂︀ ct such that ct −̂︀ ct = 0 (via quadratic root detection algorithm).
Let us define the adversaries ℬ 0 and ℬ 1 for the game EXT-LO that, upon receiving as input , run the same instantiation of PKE and output ct -respectivelŷ︀ ct. By our claim of linear-only property, there exist the extractors Ext 0 and Ext 1 for ℬ 0 and ℬ 1 , respectively, outputting 0 , . . . , , 0 , . . . , and
with non negligible probability. Knowing that ct −̂︀ ct = 0 implies either that the polynomial
is the zero polynomial, or that , are roots of , . The second case is ruled out by semantic security of the encoding scheme and Schwartz-Zippel lemma, by a reasoning similar to the proof of Theorem A.2.
The case where , = 0 gives us = ′ = 0, = ′ ∀ = 0, . . . , . Therefore, we are able to define an extractor Ext for -PKE that outputs the coefficients of the linear combination with non-negligible probability, showing that any successful adversary against -PKE able to output ct,̂︀ ct such that ct −̂︀ ct = 0, has the knowledge of the coefficients such that ct ∈ {︀ E (︀ )︀}︀
. □
B PROOF OF COMPUTATIONAL KNOWLEDGE SOUNDNESS
In this appendix, we give the complete and formal proof of computational knowledge soundness for our protocol.
Proof of computational knowledge soundness. Let Π be the PPT adversary in the game for knowledge soundness (Figure 1 ) able to produce a proof for which Π.V returned true. We first claim that it is possible to extract the coefficients of the polynomial corresponding to the values encoded in . The setup algorithm first generates the parameters pk, sk of an encoding scheme Enc and picks , , ∈ F, which are used to compute E1, E , . . . , E , E , E , . . . , E . Fix some circuit C, and let ssp be an SSP for C. Let PKE be the -PKE adversary, that takes as input a set of encodings:
(︁ pk, E1, E , . . . , E , E , E , . . . , E )︁ . The auxiliary input generator is the PPT machine that upon receiving as input , samples ←$ Z , constructs the remaining terms of the CRS (as per Equation (4)), and outputs them in using ssp. Thus, PKE sets crs ssp‖ ‖ and invokes Π crs. As a result, it obtains a proof = ,̂︀,̂︀ , , . On this proof, it computes:
where is the element encoded in . and̂︀ is an encoding of =0 . In the same way, it is possible to recover the coefficients of the polynomial ℎ used to construct ,̂︀, the first two elements of the proof of Π (again, by Eq. (eq-pke)).
Our witness-extractor Ext Π , given crs, emulates the extractor Ext PKE above on the same input , using as auxiliary information the rest of the CRS given as input to Ext Π . By the reasoning discussed above, Ext Π can recover 0 , . . . , coefficients extracted from the encodings ,̂︀ . Consider now the polynomial
=0
. If it is possible to write the polynomial as = 0 + + such that 1 , . . . , ∈ {0, 1} satisfies the assignment for the circuit C with = 1 , . . . , ℓ , then the extractor returns the witness = ℓ +1 , . . . , . With overwhelming probability, the extracted polynomial =0 does indeed provide a valid witness . Otherwise, there exists a reduction to -PDH that uses the SNARK adversary Π . Define the polynomial
We know by definition of SSP (Definition 2.1) and by Theorem 2.2 that C is satisfiable if and only if
Therefore, by contradiction, if the adversary Π does not know a witness ∈ {0, 1} −ℓ for (such that , ∈ ℛ C ), but still the two verification checks Eq. (eq-div) and Eq. (eqlin) pass, we have that either one of the following two cases must hold:
i. for ∈ {2 −1, } adversary ℬ PDH samples uniformly at random ←$ F, and defines some ∈ F (that we will formally construct later) and constructs a CRS as per Equation (4) . There are some subtleties in how ℬ PDH generates the value . In fact, can be generated without knowing its value explicitly, but rather knowing its representation over the power basis {︀ }︀ 2
=0, +1
-that is, knowing a polynomial and its evaluation in . Some particular choices of will allow us to provide a solution for a -PDH challenge. ℬ PDH invokes the adversary Π as well as the extractor Ext Π on the generated CRS, thus obtaining a proof and the linear combination used by the prover for the polynomials ℎ , and also extracts a witness for the statement being proved.
For the strong soundness (see Remark 1), in order to simulate the verification oracle and to answer the verification queries of Π , ℬ PDH has to compare its encodings (obtained from the extracted coefficients and its input) with 's proof terms, accepts if the terms match, and rejects otherwise. Because the encoding scheme is not deterministic, adversary ℬ PDH invokes the PKEQ extractor and simulates the verification oracle correctly with overwhelming probability.
The reduction in the two mentioned cases works as follows:
i. The extracted polynomials ℎ and satisfy ℎ = 2 − 1, but ℎ 2 − 1. By -PDH assumption this can happen only with negligible probability. We define = 2 − 1 − ℎ , that in this case is a nonzero polynomial of degree ≤ 2 having as a root. Let be the highest nonzero coefficient of . Writẽ = − −1 · . Since is a root of −˜, it is a root of +1 − +1−˜. ℬ PDH solves -PDH by computing E +1 = E +1−˜f or = 2 − 1. Since deg˜≤ − 1, the latter is a known linear combination of encodings E1, E , . . . , E which are available from the -PDH challenge. More precisely, ℬ PDH will compute EvalE + +1− ,˜2 −1 on fresh encodings E1, E , E 2 , . . . , E solving the -PDH challenge for ≥ 2 − 1. ii. In the second case, suppose that the polynomial mid extracted as previously described cannot be expressed as a linear combination of { ℓ +1 , . . . , , }. The proof still passes the verification, so we have a consistent value for ∈ {E mid }. ℬ PDH generates a uniformly random polynomial of degree subject to the constraint that all of the polynomials and { } =ℓ +1 have coefficient 0 for +1 . We note that for = , there are − −ℓ > 0 degrees of freedom in choosing . ℬ PDH defines to be the evaluation of in , i.e., . Remark that ℬ PDH does not know explicitly, but having access to the encodings of 2 − 1 powers of , it is able to generate valid encodings (︀ E )︀ and E using Eval. Note that, by construction of , this evaluation is of + 1 elements in F and that the + 1-th power of is never used. Now, since mid is not in the proper span, the coefficient of degree + 1 of mid must be nonzero with overwhelming probability 1 − 1|F|. The term of the proof must encode a known polynomial in :
2 =0 mid = mid where the coefficient +1 is non-trivial. ℬ PDH can subtract off encodings of multiples of other powers of to recover E +1 and break -PDH. This requires an evaluation on fresh encodings:
Adding the above to and multiplying by the inverse of the + 1-th coefficient (using once again Eval) will provide a solution to the -PDH problem for = .
Since the two cases above are not possible by -PDH assumption, Ext Π extracts a valid witness if the proof of Π is valid.
□
